March 1, 1975

STRATEGIC FORCES

	Ι,	Let me begin with a brief	discussion of	Soviet	
		strategic weapons programs	·•		
į.		A. This map shows the loc	ations where	the USSR's	25X
		ICBMs are deployed, wi	th the types	of systems	
		indicated. We believe	that	ICBM	
		launchers are currentl	y operational	. Since	
		the signing of the SAI	T agreements,	the Soviets	2
		have <u>not</u> increased the	number of IC	BM launchers.	.2
5X1		1. Of the deployed la	unchers,	are for	
		the SS-9.	_		
			The largest	number of	2!
5X1		silos, however, ar	e for the smal	ller SS-11	
•		and SS-13 systems,			
A	60 2.	yield			2!
	ICBM 7	est Programs	9		
	II.	•	·		
,					
					; .*
	DDF Pages 1				
1 × 2 1 × 12 ×	201 1 UGOU 1				Ι.
	4				



	ì		•	140	- · .
					
ade					
•					
					25
1					
1000 A					a1.

					1.4

- VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a sizeable force of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4 and the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the early to mid-1960s.
 - A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000 nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They are deployed at soft launch sites and in launch silos

		_	25X1
	1. There are currently	launchers	23/1
	for these missiles oper	ational in the	•
13.	western USSR, for use p	rimarily against	
	targets in western Euro	pe.	
	2. At one time, the Soviet		
		M launchers located	. • •
25X1			
	along the periphery of	•	25X1
	1967, however, they beg		
	some of the launch site	S.	• •
in a			25X1
			•
ā.g.			
8			
			:
A ABRUT COURS			25X1
			┧ :
			00
			į.
, i			9 1
			ts



Approved For Release 2006/10/17	: CIA-RDP80R01	731R002400210034-0
---------------------------------	----------------	--------------------

1 March 1975

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES

I.	In	recent	years,	there	have	been	fewer	develop	nents
	in	Soviet	strate	jic de	fenses	s than	ino	ffensive	mis-
	sil	les or s	submari	165.			•		

A.	The Russians still have a
	launchers at four complexes around Moscow,
hardran with ser	and there is no evidence of any effort to
	deploy ABMs elsewhere.

deploy ABMs elsewhere.

B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles, the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen Houses operating at five sites on the periphery



1 March 1975

STRATEGIC BOMBERS

٠	I.	There has been no appreciable change in the capabilities
		of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation over the past few years.
X1		A. The Soviets have a force of heavy bombers 25X1
		tankers and reconnaissance aircraft whose primary
	ė.	mission is intercontinental operations. They also have medium bombers for use mainly against 25X1
×	٠.	Europe and Asia.
• 0		1. 25X1
		1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber with
s'	•	speed in excess of Mach 2 and a range of up to
•		3,100 nautical miles under ideal flight condi-
·		tions. It is best suited for operations against
		targets in Europe and Asia.
	-	25%

4. As the Backfire is phased into the force, the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long Range Aviation should begin to decline.

The Backfire costs substantially more than older medium bombers, and so the Soviets probably will not replace them on a one-for-one basis.

1 March 1975

THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SOUADRON

- I. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean area.
 - A. The most visible military presence there is the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest group of Soviet naval ships deployed away from home waters.
 - 1. The primary mission of the Squadron is to provide a strategic defense of the Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets also have a continuing interest in improving their capabilities against ballistic missile firing submarines.
 - 2. To accomplish these goals the Soviets maintain an average--including surface combatants, submarines, and auxiliaries--

- II. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface forces in the Mediterranean continue to improve but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the US Sixth Fleet.
 - A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack submarines, cruise missile armed submarines and modern surface combatants.

ce combatants.

1	<u> </u>
1	
ı	
1	
ı	
1	
ı	
ı	
ı	
ı	
ı	
ı	
ı	
ı	
ı	
ı	
1	
ı	
1	
	and the second of the second o

expected to be fully operational in late 1976--will probably operate primarily in the Mediterranean. This

25X1

--will probably


carry V/STOL aircraft and ASW heli-

25X1

copters.

(1) These drawings show the size of the Soviet carrier in relation to US carriers.

APP III



March 1, 1975

CHINESE STRATEGIC WEAPONS

			\mathcal{V}'
I.	A m	ajor	change in the Sino-Soviet military equation
	is	Chin	a's growing nuclear capability. Today China
	can	del	iver nuclear weapons on targets around its
	per	iphe	ry by both missile and bomber.
	A.		25X1
•			25x1
	•		These missiles are of two types:
		1.	The 600 mileor medium rangemissile we
			call the CSS-1. As you can see from this
	,		map, this system can reach targets in the
			Soviet Far East, Mongolia, Korea, Japan,
		•	Taiwan, and Southeast Asia
			25X1
		2.	The 1,500 nautical milesor intermediate range
		•	missile we call the CSS-2.
			this system could strike targets ; 25X1
			in most of the eastern USSR, much of India,

and Southeast Asia as far south as Singapore.

Annielled For Rologe 2006/40/17 CIA PROPOSE AND 100

		25X1
3.	The map also shows the coverage of China's	_
	TU-16 bomber force which I will discuss a	
	bit later.	25X1
		2311
		•
		,
		Α.
		I . A



		2
		1
		·
	·	
F.	In addition to their nuclear missile force, the	,
	Chinese have TU-16 medium bombers, which	- 2
	can carry a bomb to a radius of	. 2
	about 1,650 nautical miles.	44
		. 2
		•

about 50 airfields throughout China are suitable for use by TU-16s and the bombers could be widely dispersed if Peking feared that an attack was imminent.

3.	The Chinese also have L-28 jet
_	light bombers.
	Chinese may plan to give a
	nuclear role to some of these aircraftwhich
	have an operational radius of about 550
	nautical miles.

25X1



II. The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and the Soviets appear to have nearly reached their force goals for the area.


- A. There are about 38 active divisions in the immediate border area, compared with 13 in 1964.
 - 1. The five divisions from the Siberian

 Military District that could be used as

 immediate reinforcements bring the total

 to about 43.
- B. For air support, they could call on some 1,200 tactical combat aircraft stationed in the border area.

C. The ground and tactical air forces in the border area now number about 400,000 men.



D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border reached a peak in the late Sixties the Russians have concentrated on improving and fleshing out the basic force,

25X1

E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added new divisions has slowed, they have increasingly turned their strength to developing support units at the army and front level.

25X1

The Soviet forces now in place could defend

F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend against any force the Chinese would be likely to send against the USSR in the next several years.

- As they now stand, however, they would need substantial reinforcement before engaging in protracted offensive operations deep into China.
- III. On the Chinese side, Peking has only gradually expanded the forces in its four northern military regions since the rapid build-up following the border clashes in 1969.
 - A. The force in these four northern military regions numbers about 1.6 million combat and support troops, over 45 percent of China's 3.5 million troops.
 - 1. Most of the Chinese troops are deployed well back from the border. This contrasts with the Soviets, whose forward deployment reflects a clear military superiority and a commitment to the vital Trans-Siberian Railway supply line which parallels the China border.
 - 2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized Soviet forces with their modern equipment, the Chinese are deficient in armor and artillery, and their weaponry is of 1950s design. In tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer than

4,000 in the border regions against more than 10,000 on the Soviet side.

- B. The Chinese have made use of favorable terrain features to build a series of fortified areas along the major approaches from the Soviet and Mongolian borders.
 - This suggests that the Chinese intend to conduct a determined defense in these areas.
- C. The Chinese also have aircraft in the northern military regions, about 40% of their total force. Most of the aircraft have an air defense role and are deployed in eastern China to protect important population and industrial centers.
- D. At present, Chinese troops outnumber the Soviets in the border area by more than three to one.

 Nonetheless, the Soviets would have a substantial advantage in any operations other than a deep penetration of China because of their superiority in air power and in ground force weapons.

